03 FIREFLY COLLECTION.pdf

FIREFLY COLLECTION No.3

FORTRESS

GERMAN ARMOUR

IN THE DEFENCE OF SICILY

WRITTEN BY

CLAUDE GILLONO

ILLUSTRATED BY

DENNIS OLIVER

SUPERBLY DETAILED COLOUR PROFILES, BLACK AND WHITE ARCHIVE PHOTOGRAPHS,

COMPREHENSIVE ORGANISATIONAL AND EQUIPMENT CHARTS, UNIT HISTORY AND MAPS

FIREFLY COLLECTION

FORTRESS

GERMAN ARMOUR IN THE DEFENCE OF SICILY

Written by Claude Gillono

Illustrated by Dennis Oliver

ISBN 978-0-9876013-0-8

Acknowledgments. The author and publisher would like to thank the staff of the National Archive and Research Administration, Maryland in the United States,

and the National Library of Australia, Canberra, for their invaluable assistance and advice. We would also like to thank all those who contribute to the Tiger Im

Focus website, the Axis History Forum, the Feldgrau Forum, Panzer-Archiv.de, Die Deutsche Wehrmacht website, the Sturmartillerie website and Brett Green at

Missing Lynx. We also wish to thank Bernard Cher of M Workshop, Singapore and Lim Kian Guan for their kind permission to reproduce the photograph of the

scale model Tiger I which appears on the back cover. Further work can be seen at www.themworkshop.com. In addition we would also like to extend our thanks to

Lorenzo Bovi, Federico Peyrani , Giovanni Iacono, Ivan Biazzo and Martin Block. In addition to the websites mentioned above, the following printed works were

also consulted: Die Truppenkennzeicen der Verbände und Einheiten der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS und ihre Einsätze im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-

1945. Schmitz, P and Theis K-J. Panzer Colors II. Culver, B. Deutsche Kampfpanzer in Farbe 1939-45. Scheibert, H. Deutsche Fahrzeugraritäten 1914-45. Hoppe,

H. Panzer IV and its Variants. Spielberger, W. J. Pz.Kpfw. IV Ausf G/H/J. Vol 2. Trojca, W. Panzerjäger und Sturmgeschütze. Schiebert, H. Achtung Panzer No. 5.

Sturmgeschütz III, Stug. IV & SIG.33. Bitoh, M. (Editor). Sturmartillerie. Spielberger, W. J. and Feist, U. Sturmgeschütz III and IV 1942-45. Doyle, H and Jentz, T.

Sturmgeschütz 40. Schiebert, H. D. Sdkfz 251. Ledwoch, J. Deutsche Sturmgeschütze Im Einsatz. Fleischer, W. Panzer Tracts No. 11-1.

Panzerbeobachtungswagen. Jentz, T. L . and Doyle, H. L. Kampfpanzer III. Scheibert, H. Panzerkampfwagen IV. Schiebert, H. Der Panzerkampfwagen IV.

Fleischer, W. Pz.Kpfw. IV Ausf G, H and J. Jentz, T and Doyle, H. Germany's Tiger Tanks. Jentz, T. L. and Doyle, H. L. Tigers In Combat I. Schneider, W. Tiger. Kleine,

E. and Kühn, V. Panzer IV. Hjermstad, K. Sdkfz 251. Kliment, C. Sturmgeschütz III . Culver, B. Panzertruppen 1943-45. Jentz, T. L. (Editor) Bitter Victory: The Battle

For Sicily. D’Este, C. The Battle For Sicily: How The Allies Lost Their Chance For Total Victory. Mitcham, S.W. and Stauffenberg, F. Sicily And The Surrender Of

Italy. Garland, A.N. Sicily: Whose Victory? Blumenson, M. Hermann Göring Panzer Division In Sicily. Gillono, C.

The illustrations in this book were all created using contemporary photographs as a reference and we have attempted to create as faithful a reproduction as

possible - including the shape and position of any camouflage pattern, markings and the style of lettering used. In the few cases where we have been forced to

speculate we have tried to make this clear. Where possible, we have reproduced the photograph or photographs so used, however copyright and budgetary

restrictions do not always allow this.

Published by ADH Publishing ,

Doolittle Mill

Doolittle Lane

Totternhoe

Bedfordshire LU6 1QX

United Kingdom

Produced in co-operation with The Oliver Publishing Group

Patent Act, 1988, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical,

optical photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of ADH Publishing. All enquiries should be addressed to the publisher.

Picture Credits. All photographs National Archives and Record Administration, except: Bundesarchiv: 9, 25; J. Howard Parker: 4, 28, 31, 33; Editor’s Collection: IFC, 4, 28, 30; .Ullstein

via K.Berne: 8; K.Berne: 21, 27; IWM: 27, 28.

Front cover: Sturmhaubitze 42. III.Abteilung, Panzer-Regiment Hermann Göring. Sicily, 1943. This vehicle is also shown in full and discussed in the illustration

section on page 18 and in the photograph at the top of page 23.

Above: The cuff title worn by all members of

the Hermann Göring Panzer-Division, the

largest German armoured formation in Sicily.

At right: The last surviving Tiger of

2.Kompanie, schwere Panzer-Abteilung 504

leaves Messina bound for the Italian mainland

on 17 August 1943. Although this battalion lost

all but one of its tanks German material losses

were relatively light in view of the intensity of

the fighting and the inhospitable nature of the

terrain. Indeed, almost half of the casualties

suffered were due to illness, mainly malaria.

The campaign in Sicily lasted for thirty-eight hot, gruelling days at the height of

the summer - from 10 July to 17 August 1943. In a fierce struggle that raged day

and night, one Italian Army backed by a German Corps attempted to force two

Allied Armies back into the sea. The Italians were of course fighting for their

native soil while the Germans were under no illusions that an Allied failure

would not only delay an invasion of the Italian mainland but might well

postpone - or even prevent - a landing in North-west Europe.

Defending the island was the Italian 6th Army, commanded by General Alfredo

Guzzoni, made up of two corps, each of four infantry divisions. The Italian force

also included other mobile formations and coastal defence units although

some of these were of dubious military value. To add to Guzzoni's difficulties,

many of the larger port cities were designated Naval Defence Areas whose

commanders were under no obligation to obey his orders or even confer with

his officers.

The Germans had been stationing units in Sicily since early 1943 expecting that

if North Africa was abandoned the island would be the most likely location for

an Allied assault. It was not until 16 July however, almost a week after the initial

landings, that the headquarters of XIV.Panzerkorps was created - or rather

reformed after its destruction at Stalingrad - to co-ordinate the German

formations on the island and their expected reinforcements. The German corps

was commanded by General der Panzertruppe Hans-Valentin Hube, an

extremely capable soldier who began the war commanding a regiment in

Poland and was renowned for his ability to co-ordinate defensive operations.

Hitler himself referred to Hube as Der Mensch - the Man.

Until XIV.Panzerkorps headquarters was able to make its way to Sicily, the two

German formations stationed on the island - Panzer-Division Hermann Göring,

commanded by Generalmajor Paul Conrath and 15.Panzergrenadier-Division,

formed from Division Sizilien on 6 July, under Generalmajor Eberhardt Rodt -

were, nominally at least, under the tactical control of 6th Italian Army. It seems

unlikely however that the Germans accepted this situation as anything other

than a convenient fiction intended to placate an ally in whose ability they had

little confidence. Indeed, Conrath and Rodt deferred to Generalleutnant

Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin, the German liaison officer at 6th Army

headquarters, in all matters. For his part von Senger reported directly to

Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, who as Oberbefehlshaber Süd was the

overall commander of German forces in the Mediterranean. The Germans’

insistence on von Senger's appointment to 6th Army headquarters had in fact

been a first step in gaining operational control over their own units. In any

event, with the arrival of Hube on 16 July, General Guzzoni ceded to him control

of all areas where German units were fighting - which of course also meant the

effective control of any Italian Army units operating in those areas.

From Monday, 2 August Hube was given command of the entire Sicilian

defence.

Following the Allied landings which began during the night of 9-10 July 1943,

the original German defenders had been quickly reinforced by elements of

1.Fallschirmjäger-Division which had been refitting at Avignon in France. The

division's Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 3 arrived spectacularly by parachute, just

in time to foil a British attempt to capture Primosole Bridge, the only crossing of

the Simeto River, south of Catania. Throughout the campaign the division was

used as a 'Fire-Brigade' and finally as a rearguard when the decision was made

to evacuate the island. Fighting stubbornly until the end, the Green Devils were

the last Germans to leave Sicily. Beginning in mid-July, units of

29.Panzergrenadier-Division began crossing the Straits of Messina from the

Italian Mainland to further reinforce the garrison.

The offensive phase of the Axis reaction to the Allied landings proved to be very

short. The failure of an immediate large scale counterattack against the US

troops on the Gela beaches through Saturday 10 July and the following day and

the capture of Syracuse, Sicily's only natural deep-water port, within 48 hours

of the landings convinced the Germans that the island would ultimately be lost.

Planning for the eventual evacuation of Sicily - Operation Lehrgang - could in

fact be said to have begun as early as 14 July when Oberst Ernst-Günther Baade

was placed in command of the Messina Straits area. An experienced and highly

competent officer, Baade's authority far exceeded his rank and army, navy and

Luftwaffe units in the area were subject to his orders. Work began immediately

on what would come to be known as the Messina Flak corridor which covered

both sides of the straits and would provide the anti-aircraft protection vital for

an orderly withdrawal. On July 26, while the defence of the island continued,

Mussolini was removed from power by the Fascist Grand Council and arrested.

At his headquarters in Rome Kesselring informed Oberst von Bonin,

XIV.Panzerkorps chief of staff, that if Italy were to leave the alliance all German

units in Sicily were to immediately disengage and prepare to withdraw from

the island.

Added to the tactical situation was the strategic consideration that valuable

resources of men and material would be earmarked for the Russian front

where Operation Zitadel was already underway. The Italian command

however insisted that Sicily, as part of their homeland, could not be abandoned

and the defence must continue. In reality many of their units in the field quickly

disintegrated and the defence was soon mainly based around the available

German troops. Although some Italian formations such as the Livorno Division

fought bravely - on one occasion at least proceeding with an attack when

promised German armour and artillery support failed to materialise - they

were hopelessly outnumbered and outclassed by the Allied units and weapons

that they faced.

............continued on page 3

Photographed heading inland from the town of Letojanni in August 1943, along what is today Strada

Provinciale 13, this SdKfz 138/1 Grille or Bison self-propelled heavy infantry gun is from 9.Kompanie,

Panzergrenadier-Regiment 1 Hermann Göring. The unit insignia identifying the regiment and company

can be clearly seen behind the barrel of the 15cm howitzer. Photographs of these vehicles operating in

Sicily are quite rare as so few served there.

The same vehicle shown on page 1, probably photographed earlier in the day as it leaves Letojanni

by the Via Vittoria Emanuele. Letojanni is a small town on the east coast of Sicily approximately 3

kilometres north of Taormina on the road to Messina. Inset: A Marder II 7.5cm self-propelled anti-

tank gun. Of note are the many ammunition containers on the rear deck. A number of these

vehicles were operated by the eleventh companies of both the Panzergrenadier regiments of the

Hermann Göring division and also by 1.Fallschirmjäger-Division.

The major armoured units, Panzer-Division Hermann Göring and

15.Panzergrenadier-Division, were deployed for the most part in the north-

west of the island and faced the US Army while the other German units

confronted the British and Canadians around Catania and Etna, slowly falling

back towards Messina and the strait - the escape route to the mainland. As a

tactical operation, the German evacuation was a complete success with the

first units crossing to the mainland on Sunday, 8 August and the largest

numbers being ferried across during the following Wednesday night. In

subsequent days the German anti-aircraft umbrella proved to be so effective

that crossings were conducted in full daylight from 13 August onwards.

Much has been made in post-war accounts of the ineptitude of the German

field commanders fighting in Sicily and in certain instances the accusations are

well founded. In particular a number of senior officers of the Hermann Göring

division had been appointed to their commands for no other reason than that

they were favourites of the Reichmarschall, most having been former pilots

with no experience of warfare on the ground. The almost perverse nature of

some of their decisions is somewhat easier to understand when this is taken

into consideration. What is not so easily understood is their willingness to

blame the men under their command for their own failures. Possibly the sole

exception to this was Oberst Schmalz who would eventually command the

division. Those few officers should not however cloud our view of men like Karl

Ens, Fritz Fullriede and Theo Körner - all regimental commanders with

15.Panzergrenadier Division - and many others. The fact remains that some

half-million British, Canadian and US Army troops were held off by just over

sixty thousand Germans who for the most part managed to escape with much

of their equipment and almost all their wounded.

Neither was the loss of Sicily the strategic disaster that Allied propaganda

claimed. It is true that Mussolini - Hitler's closest ally - had been ousted from

supreme command and the new Italian Regime brought closer to - and in fact

secretly negotiating - surrender. However, the Germans never expected that

the island would be held indefinitely and while the Allies were occupied there,

German reinforcements were flooding into mainland Italy ensuring that any

assault up the peninsula would be long and costly - as indeed it was.

When the Allied invasion began in the early hours of 10 July 1943, the two

German divisions at that time stationed in Sicily were scattered across the

island. Moving west in anticipation of the Allied landings, 15.Panzergrenadier-

Division was strung out along the western tip of the island. The main body of

Panzer-Division Hermann Göring was deployed in the Gela Plain while a

Kampfgruppe, or battle group, commanded by Oberst Wilhelm Schmalz

protected the larger Catania Plain and its airfields. A considerable part of

Kampfgruppe Schmalz was made up of a regimental sized battle group,

Kampfgruppe Körner, formed for the most part from the infantrymen of

Panzergrenadier-Regiment 115 of 15.Panzergrenadier-Division. This was

indicative of the Hermann Göring division's paucity of infantry. The

paratroopers of 1.Fallschirmjäger-Division were immediately sent to the south

to face the British and Canadians, while the men of 29.Panzergrenadier-

Division found themselves fighting against the US Army in the north and in the

shrinking Axis bridgehead by the end of July.

The major German units which took part in the campaign are presented here in

order of their arrival in Sicily.

15.Panzergrenadier-Division. The division was formed in Sicily from the

remnants of 15.Panzer-Division which had been lost in North Africa. The

original intention had been to reform the division as a tank formation complete

with its previous title. Indeed, this was a common practice in the German army

throughout the war. During its formation the division absorbed a local

Heerestruppen unit, Panzer-Abteilung 215 and during this time it was decided -

probably as insufficient tanks would be available in the near future to form the

tank regiment needed for a full Panzer division - that the unit would be raised

as a Panzergrenadier division with a single battalion of tanks. Given little time

to attain combat readiness - in May 1943 the division was informed that its

formation and training needed to be completed by 15 June - the division was

only ever able to form three Kampfgruppen. Each group was organised around

one of the division's Panzergrenadier regiments with Kampfgruppe Ens

utilising the personnel of Panzergrenadier-Regiment 104, Kampfgruppe

Fullriede the men of Panzergrenadier-Regiment 129 and Kampfgruppe Körner

those of Panzergrenadier-Regiment 115. The latter however, as has already

been mentioned, was removed from the division and attached to

Kampfgruppe Schmalz. A fourth battle group - Kampfgruppe Neapel or Naples

- was later built around Schnelle Abteilung 15, which was itself an ad hoc unit

created to replace the division's missing anti-tank and reconnaissance

battalions. It contained a Stab or headquarters unit, a Panzergrenadier

company of one armoured and two motorised platoons, a motorised

Panzerjäger company and a single artillery battery of two guns.

As previously stated, the Heerestruppen unit Panzer-Abteilung 215 supplied

the armoured component of the division. Unusually, for some time the

battalion deployed a company of the formidable Tiger I tank, detached from

schwere Panzer-Abteilung 504. The latter was nominally under the command

of the Hermann Göring division and in addition to its Tigers had a number of

Pzkw III tanks on hand when the battalion arrived in Sicily. The latter were

almost immediately transferred to 15.Panzergrenadier-Division which had

been previously equipped with Pzkw IV tanks only.

Each Panzergrenadier regiment as a rule comprised a Stab or staff company,

with three Grenadier battalions - each made up of a staff unit, three

............continued on page 6

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