Ellul 2.pdf

Hegemony, Agency, and Dialectic Tension

Hegemony, Agency, and Dialectical

Tension in Ellul’s Technological Society

by Rick Clifton Moore

Recent writers have questioned hegemony theory as a way of understanding the

relationship among the citizen, the media, and the state. In this essay I propose the

work of Jacques Ellul for reconceptualizing this relationship. Ellul’s focus on a

technological state and a mass-mediated society presents a powerful alternative to

Gramsci’s focus. Ellul argued that the modern state is the product of the invasion of

technique throughout society. Such an environment demands a form of commu-

nication Ellul described as propaganda. This view does not offer great hope for

political groups to bring about fundamental social change. Instead, it suggests that

the primary role of the social critic is to stand in dialectical tension to the techno-

logical state.

Celeste Condit (1994) has stated that the term hegemony recently “passed from

status as a buzzword for the academic left into everyday usage in the political

lexicon” (p. 205). Yet, just as the broader community is embracing the term, the

scholarly community appears to be developing a more cautious attitude toward

the utility of the notion of hegemony. Both Condit (1994) and Barker-Plummer

(1995) have recently investigated hegemony theory to judge its continued useful-

ness in the study of mass communication. Both have argued that it is time to move

beyond the framework of the past 2 decades and add new life to the study of

ideology and the media.

Perhaps one way to add new life to any discussion of hegemony and the media

is to pay closer attention to the prolific writings of Jacques Ellul. Ellul’s theoretical

perspective offers fresh challenges to some of the problems that have been noted

with earlier views of the relationship among the state, media, and individual. In

this essay, I briefly discuss the nature of hegemony theory, present common con-

cerns in the field, and suggest ways in which Ellul’s work offers potentially fruitful

alternatives to traditional notions in this area of study.

Rick Clifton Moore (PhD, University of Oregon, 1987) is assistant professor in the Department of

Communication at Boise State University. His areas of interest are the social theory of Jacques Ellul and

news coverage of environmental issues. An earlier version was presented at the 1996 convention of the

Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Anaheim, CA.

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Journal of Communication, Summer 1998

Hegemony Theory and Its Modern Variants

The idea of hegemony has been widely discussed in political science, sociology,

and communication since Antonio Gramsci (1971) introduced it in its most popu-

lar form over 50 years ago. Gramsci believed that the dominance of a regime

necessitated two kinds of power, coercive military force and civil leadership (Condit,

1994). The first of these is easily visible. Gramsci called it domination. For the

second, less obvious form of power, he used the term hegemony. Perhaps be-

cause of its hidden character, there has been widespread disagreement about

exactly what hegemony is and is not. Condit (1994) cited Femia (1987), who

stated that “despite the huge and ever-growing pile of secondary literature, there

remains to this day remarkably little general agreement about what Gramsci really

said” (p. 8). To comprehend some of the many attempts that have been made at

understanding and mapping the field, one can look at the work of Lewis (1992),

Gottdiener (1985), Carragee (1993), and Laclau and Mouffe (1985).

For our purposes, Condit (1994) offered a useful distinction between two key

trends in the field of study. One trend sees hegemonic communication as emanat-

ing from a single controlling entity. Condit (1994) claimed that such an approach

to the subject is closer to classical Marxism than to a Gramscian understanding.

The other trend is more humanistic and suggests a multivocality in the modern

state. This multivocality is found in a milieu that guarantees preferred readings

always rise to the top.

Gitlin (1980), who brought the concept of hegemony to the forefront of U.S.

communication scholarship, also recognized a tension between two modes of

thought when developing an analysis of news coverage of the 1960s protest group,

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Gitlin relied on Williams (1973) to sug-

gest that a rigid Marxist base–superstructure dichotomy (similar to Condit’s first

trend) might not be the best way to understand how the media covered SDS.

Utilizing Williams (1973) and Gramsci (1971), Gitlin felt that a more useful ap-

proach was to see hegemony as the process by which limits are set on the various

ideologies that circulate in a modern society. This is clearly similar to what Condit

(1994) described as the second trend. Gitlin went on to say that he did not feel we

need accept all of Gramsci’s baggage. What he maintained, however, was a core

conception that “those who rule the dominant institutions secure their power in

large measure directly and indirectly , by impressing their definitions of the situa-

tion upon those they rule and, if not usurping the whole ideological space, still

significantly limiting what is thought throughout society” (Gitlin, 1980, p. 10).

These thoughts on Gramsci were widely read and sparked new interest in the

study of hegemony. Gitlin’s (1980) work was important in bringing the concept of

hegemony to the mainstream of communication research.

Challenges to Hegemony Theory

Though Gitlin (1980) has suggested that we drop much of the baggage of Gramsci’s

original ideas, it is worth noting the baggage that remains tucked away and pre-

served in the core conception. In this section, I wish to suggest that three crucial

areas, suggested in Gitlin’s statement, need further discussion: (a) the nature of

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Hegemony, Agency, and Dialectic Tension

the dominant institutions, (b) the means by which institutions secure power and

impress definitions, and (c)˚ the natue of those whom these institutions rule. Barker-

Plummer (1995) and Condit (1994) both saw these as important areas of analysis.

After a brief introduction of the problem traditional hegemony theory poses in

each of the three areas, I will give a more detailed account of Ellul’s orientation as

an alternative.

The first of Gramsci’s key conceptions that Gitlin (1980) borrowed is institu-

tions. The difficulty posed here is that the institutions Gramsci found in pre-World

War II Italy are very different from the institutions we find around us today. Cer-

tainly, nation-states have changed in drastic ways. In addition, the relationship

between the state and industry has changed. This was a crucial area of concern for

Condit (1994) and her critique of hegemony theory. She went to great lengths to

demonstrate that Gramsci’s environment as it was socially determined in the 1930s

in Europe, was radically different than ours today. I will discuss later that Ellul

suggested the state is different today, and its relation to other institutions has

changed.

For now, it is worth mentioning that one way Ellul has argued that relations

have changed is the overwhelming presence of mass communication. This relates

directly to the second of Gramsci’s key conceptions, the means by which power is

secured. Condit (1994) might pique our interest in the Ellulian position by admit-

ting two shortcomings in the use of Gramsci’s work. First, Gramsci wrote in a

culture that was not technologically motivated. Second, he lived in a culture that

was not saturated with mass media. Ellul lived to see a world that was both

technologically driven and mass mediated. Ellul appears to have had a thorough

understanding of both important aspects of modern societies.

The final core conception from Gramsci that we will need to investigate, from

an Ellulian perspective, is human agency . Gitlin (1980) spoke of limitations on

thought within ideological space but never thoroughly discussed the degree of

power the individual might have therein. This is an important issue for both Barker-

Plummer (1995) and Condit (1994). Both saw in hegemony theory a tendency to

discount human agency, which led to despair. Barker-Plummer (1995) offered the

following critique:

Perhaps the most limiting aspect of a closed hegemonic model such as Gitlin

suggests, is that it seems to deny the reflexivity or strategic agency on the part

of social movement actors themselves to learn about and strategically use

dominant systems and discourses—in this case journalistic routines and prac-

tices—as resources in themselves. (p. 309)

Condit (1994) read traditional hegemony theory in a similar way and offered a

modified version in hopes that such “provides the springboard for a model of

evolutionary social change produced by the interaction of multiple contesting

groups” (p. 226). In the end, both Barker-Plummer (1995) and Condit proposed

new models for the relationship between the media and various groups within the

public. Barker-Plummer referred to her new vision as a “dialogical” media-move-

ment relationship. Condit (1994) labeled what she created as a “model of con-

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Journal of Communication, Summer 1998

cord.” Their hope appears to have been that, in abandoning some preconceptions

involved in this third element of Gramscian theory (a lack of human agency), they

could find a way to bring about positive social changes. This is where Ellulian

theory is radically different from Gramscian hegemony theory, as well as the

Barker-Plummer and Condit alternatives. Although Ellul’s work does not deny

human agency (as the Gramscian approach is accused of doing), it also does not

offer great hope for profound social change through institutions such as the state

and the mass media.

In the three main sections that follow, we will see how Ellul’s logic suggests

that the nature of the state, the role of the mass media, and the nature of the

citizen do not allow for such optimism. Before stepping through that logic, how-

ever, it will be helpful to begin with a discussion of the foundational element in

Ellul’s work, the idea technique.

An Ellulian Alternative to Hegemony Theory

Technique as a Determining Factor

One cannot begin to understand specific applications of Ellul’s work without first

understanding his broader theoretical approach, which begins and ends with his

concept of technique . Technique, for Ellul, was the most important factor in the

development of the modern social world. In his words, it “is related to every

factor in the life of modern man” (Ellul, 1964, p. xxvi). Though U.S. readers might

at first think he was speaking of technology, that is not the case. Machines and

technology are only a small part of technique. For Ellul (1964), technique was “the

totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given

stage of development) in every field of human activity” (p. xxv).

Ellul (1964) argued that it is this phenomenon that develops the character of

our modern technological society. Though technique has been a part of civiliza-

tions dating to primitive times, modern technique is different than primitive tech-

nique both in degree and kind. Up to the 19th century, technique was under

human control, but it soon took on a new character. To help understand this

character, Ellul listed seven attributes of technique in modern society: rationality,

artificiality, technical automatism, self-augmentation, monism, universalism, and

autonomy (p. 79). Benello (1981) offered a thorough discussion of the importance

of these concepts. We should realize that in the current historical era, technique

begins to run free and eventually to reign over society. As Stivers (1993) para-

phrased Ellul’s description of this historical transition, “Because of an unbounded

faith in technology and a conscious intention to experiment with technology and

find a diversity of uses for a single technique, technology came to dominate cul-

ture” (p. 516). The modern world of the late 20th century, from an Ellulian per-

spective, is thus radically different than any other era.

As technique takes hold over the world, efficiency becomes the key determi-

nant of human affairs. This is why Ellul’s thinking applies to more than just tech-

nology. In the technological society, human beings become so enamored with

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efficiency that they soon apply the principles of mechanics to all aspects of life.

Christians (1976) aptly suggested that technique “refers not to machines but

machineness” (p. 3). Such machineness is not only applied to material production.

It is applied to social production as well. Obviously the work environment is

changed by the growing power of technique. Less obviously, the family, religion,

the arts, and government are affected. Given his background as a student of

history and law, Ellul was especially interested in this last category. Technique’s

relationship to the state is of great importance.

Technique and the Modern State

Noting the importance of the state might cause difficulty in two ways. One diffi-

culty is convincing scholars that the state is worth discussing. Ellul’s early work

bucked a trend in which scholars paid little interest to the state. Braman (1995)

wrote that the field of communication policy studies has for decades been charac-

terized by “statelessness” (p. 4). This might be said of the broader field of commu-

nication theory. Focusing on other dimensions of social processes, many researchers

have tended to ignore fundamental questions about the state. Ellul (1964) did not

err in this direction. Instead, he made analysis of the state an important aspect of

many of his writings, including The Technological Society , which set up issues to

be dealt with in later works.

Although not avoiding discussion of the state, Ellul did not hinge his work on

a narrow definition of the state. This is the other difficulty his excursion into this

subject poses. One of the frustrations for most readers of the French writer is the

broad brushstrokes with which he painted. Benello (1981) wrote, in reference to

The Technological Society, that it “operates more in terms of auras and impres-

sions than clearly defined ideas” (p. 91). Whether this aura-like writing was the

product of Ellul’s existential philosophy, a desire to present ideas that could be

comprehended in diverse cultures, or some other phenomenon, we can only

speculate. Though still speculative, there is some evidence to suggest that Ellul

was looking for the big picture, not the details. Thus, Stanley (1981) pointed out

the ambiguous and occasionally contradictory nature of Ellul’s work. Specifically,

he mentioned how Ellul “argues that the state is simultaneously omnipotent and

merely supervisory” (p. 84). What Stanley demonstrated in analyzing Ellul’s work

in relation to Hobbesianism, is that the state must be defined clearly enough to

understand the individual’s relation to it (as in the relation between a citizen and

the sovereign). In this light, we can understand that Ellul’s purpose in the late 20th

century was simply to demonstrate the distinctions that made the technological

state different from the traditional state.

The fruit of this endeavor, though of limited value to some who might want

specific analysis of specific forms of the modern state, is beneficial in our current

discussion. Recall that Condit (1994) suggested that one drawback in hegemony

theory is the tendency to think that Gramsci’s views of the state (developed in

1930s Italy) are valid today. Ellul (1964) shared these concerns. As noted above,

he decried the inability of his fellow scholars to see the necessity of examining the

state. He also decried their inability to observe changes in its nature:

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