Lesbian And Gay Marriage.pdf

III. Feminist Theory and the Question of Lesbian and

Gay Marriage

Maria BEVACQUA

For feminists, the question of lesbian and gay marriage is, or should be, inextri-

cably bound to the ongoing critique of marriage as an institution. That critique

originates in the theoretical and practical indictment of all social institutions, built

upon inequality and exclusion, which function as tools of male dominance. The

existing political movement to acquire marriage rights for lesbians and gays

appears to avoid this critique; instead, in the liberal political tradition, it seeks

simply to secure for gay and lesbian people the same legal rights that hetero-

sexual people enjoy.

In this article, I explore the question of lesbian and gay marriage through the

lens of feminist theory, first delineating briefly the feminist critique of marriage

as articulated historically and contemporarily. I then argue why it is necessary for

gays and lesbians to press for the right to marry: the second-class citizenship

created by the state’s differential treatment of gays and lesbians, I contend, is no

position from which to launch a viable challenge to the status quo. I intend here

to enrich the theoretical debate with practical considerations of the meaning of

inequality, and to enhance the social movement for lesbian and gay rights with

ideological insights from the feminist struggle. I write as a feminist, a lesbian, and

a thinker deeply concerned with the meanings of liberation on multiple fronts.

Feminist critiques of marriage have ranged from philosophers’ censure of

marriage as fostering gender inequality (Mill and Mill, 1970[1869]) to the free

lovers’ admonition that marriage shackles the human spirit (see D’Emilio and

Freedman, 1988). They comprise Emma Goldman’s (1970[1917]) assertion that

marriage makes woman a parasite at best, a prostitute at worst, and The

Feminists’ flamboyant actions rejecting this ‘inherently inequitable’ institution in

theory and practice (Echols, 1989: 176). They further include the radical feminist

Vol. 14(1): 36–40; 0959-3535

DOI: 10.1177/0959-353504040300

Special Feature : BEVACQUA: The Question of Lesbian and Gay Marriage

view that marriage hampers women’s solidarity and attaches women to their

oppressors (Jones and Brown, 1968). While heterosexual, often married, women

issued most of these theoretical tracts, lesbian feminists were not silent on the

matter. Not only did lesbian feminists call for the eradication of marriage, they

also strongly suspected monogamy and emotional security as manifestations of

women’s oppression and male-identification (Radicalesbians, 1994[1970]).

Lesbian theorists have further questioned the assumption of heterosexuality as

normal and natural, and proposed instead that honest feminist analysis reveals the

many ways in which women are compelled to live heterosexual lives and to

marry (Rich, 1986[1980]). Recent work has investigated the tenacity of wedding

discourse in our shared cultural imagery, shedding light upon the $32 billion per

year US ‘wedding-industrial complex’ (Ingraham, 1999). This and other works

(Cott, 2000; Geller, 2001) have reinvigorated the feminist critique of marriage

and enhanced the current debate over lesbian and gay marriage rights.

For me, a lesbian feminist thinker and writer, the question of lesbian and gay

marriage is embedded in this theoretical and activist tradition. Some feminist

and progressive writers (e.g. Ettelbrick, 1997[1989]; Warner, 2000) argue that

marriage rights represent the assimilation of queer sexuality into a queer-hating

society, rendering us bland and colorless against a heterosexual landscape and

failing to liberate sexuality (Pierce, 1997[1995]). I argue instead that for any kind

of gay and lesbian social movement to make significant gains on our behalf, it

must make the removal of all formal inequalities a priority. The exclusion of a

portion of the population from a major social institution creates a second-class

citizenship for that group. This is a humiliating experience, whether as indi-

viduals we feel humiliated or not. Legalized same-sex marriage must be a prior-

ity for gay and lesbian activism. Rather than dismiss the pursuit of this right as so

much liberal reformism, feminist theorists must contend fully with the meaning

of exclusion for all people.

Two important questions accompany the issue of whether gays and lesbians

should have the right to marry. First, what are the privileged willing to do to make

this happen? Many of my heterosexual ‘allied’ friends are firm in their support

for this right, but I wonder what they are doing to make this legal change happen.

Are they willing to speak about it to all their constituents and lobby for political

change? Are they willing to refuse this very tangible privilege until it becomes

universal? Will the married among them obtain divorces until their circle opens

itself to all? Does ‘the personal is political’ continue to have meaning? In Peggy

McIntosh’s (1998[1988]) list of the privileges she enjoys based on having white

skin, none of the privileges are freely chosen. McIntosh no longer enjoys the

privilege of superior public schools for her children or drinking fountains

reserved for people with her skin color. Can it be more obvious that marriage is

a restricted club that heterosexual people publicly join in spite of its exclusionary

policies (Van Gelder, 1995[1984])? It is not enough for the oppressed to voice

their demands; the privileged play a crucial role in creating systemic change. The

task of these allies is first to recognize their own implication in heterosexist

Feminism & Psychology 14(1)

oppression and second to implement tactics of refusal, resistance, and publicity

to join the political project of sexual liberation.

My second question is, what will gays and lesbians do once we attain this

right? Pursuing a reform strategy is not a problem; thinking that all we need is a

reform strategy is. Once the right is achieved, are we going to embrace this

historically fraught, sexist institution wholeheartedly? Will we march ourselves

quickly to the trendiest department stores to register for expensive gifts and

get fitted for Vera Wang designer gowns, in preparation for our queen-for-a-day

nuptials? Will we squeal with joy at the sight of our friends’ rock-studded

engagement rings? Will we busy ourselves with bridal showers and honeymoon

vacations? I am afraid that is exactly what will happen, as it is happening already

among the commitment ceremony set. The institution of marriage, and the

wedding-industrial complex that supports it (Ingraham, 1999), will not dissolve

once gays and lesbians gain admission. The numerous benefits accompanying

marriage have been documented (e.g. Mohr, 1997[1995]) and are destined to out-

live the ban. But are these grounds for ongoing discrimination?

The attainment of the right to marry means that gays and lesbians will have to

decide for ourselves just how much we want to participate in supporting this insti-

tution. Radical feminists correctly theorized that marriage is built upon women’s

subordination and that there are no individual solutions to problems that are

shared collectively. Once same-sex marital rights are achieved, we can expect the

negative consequences for non-marriage among gays to resemble those for

heterosexuals currently. Single heterosexual mothers, particularly those who

receive public assistance, know full well that failure or refusal to marry carries a

price. Only sophisticated coalition politics will transform marriage.

Furthermore, it is not necessary to argue that ‘marriage is good,’ as have other

gay and lesbian writers (Eskridge, 1996; Sullivan, 1997; Graff, 1999), to advocate

for the right to marry. Indeed, 1970s US feminists did not have to argue that the

prospect of mandatory military service was ‘good’ when they supported passage of

the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) guaranteeing women full equality under the

law. The fear of a gender-neutral draft fueled American doubts about the ERA. But

supporters could state that, with the ERA, women would have the same obligation

as men to consult their conscience about whether to comply with or resist the draft

(Williams, 1982). Equality was the ‘good’ they were seeking (the ERA failed to be

ratified). With same-sex marriage recognized as a legal right, both gays and

straights will have to grapple with the question of whether they will participate in a

fundamentally flawed institution and what they will do to change it.

Activist and writer Leslie Cagan (1999) describes an analogous issue from the

early-1990s. As a member of the movement for lesbian and gay liberation, and an

opponent of all forms of injustice, she supported the effort to remove the ban on

gays and lesbians in the US military. But as a leftist and longtime critic of

American military imperialism, implicated in much global mayhem and injustice,

she cannot help but carry this critique into all discussions of lifting the ban.

Rather than submit to single-minded, patriotic, pro-military fervor, she argues,

Special Feature : BEVACQUA: The Question of Lesbian and Gay Marriage

progressive lesbians and gays must call into question the very institution into

which we seek admission. In this article, I make a similar argument with respect

to marriage.

Some may read this as an expediency argument, one that sets aside moral (or

feminist) principle in the interest of pragmatism. Expediency arguments are

risky: for example, nineteenth-century woman suffragists in the US were willing

to play into the hands of southern racists in the hopes of attaining the vote by

urging the South to embrace (white) woman suffrage as a counterbalance to the

newly acquired black male vote (Davis, 1983). But feminists know that the

institution of marriage needs to be radically transformed to rid it of inequality or

abolished altogether (Fineman, 1995). Second-class citizens are in no position to

launch such a transformation. The mainstream population, along with policy

makers, can more easily dismiss the demands of the disenfranchised than of those

who possess full legal equality. Marriage rights belong on the lesbian and gay

agenda because, once we achieve equality of rights, the real work of liberation

can begin.

The feminist critique of marriage offers us a vision for radical transformation of

societal institutions. It forces us to think creatively about the problem and the

solution. The lesbian and gay agenda for liberation would do well to understand this

critique, honor it, and take it seriously. The path to liberation is a long one; in the

meantime, we need to work to dismantle those systems of inequality that treat us as

lesser human beings. Let us refuse the second-class citizenship we are handed by

challenging it head-on; but let us prepare for the larger battle at the same time.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to thank Cathryn Bailey for the many conversations that led me to write this essay.

REFERENCES

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Feminism’, Women’s Rights Law Reporter 7: 175–200.

Maria BEVACQUA is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of

Women’s Studies at Minnesota State University, Mankato, Minnesota, USA.

She is the author of Rape on the Public Agenda: Feminism and the Politics of

Sexual Assault (Northeastern University Press, 2000).

ADDRESS: Department of Women’s Studies, 109 Morris Hall, Minnesota State

University, Mankato, Minnesota 56001, USA.

[email: maria.bevacqua@mnsu.edu]

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