Critique Of Dreyfus.pdf

Inquiry ,41,65±87

GettingHeideggerOfftheWestCoast

CarletonB.Christensen

AustralianNationalUniversity

AccordingtoHubertL.Dreyfus,Heidegger’scentralinnovationishisrejectionof

theideathatintentionalactivityanddirectednessisalwaysandonlyamatterof

havingrepresentationalmentalstates.Thispaperexaminesthecentralpassagesto

whichDreyfusappealsinordertomotivatethisclaim.ItshowsthatDreyfus

misconstruesthesepassagessignificantlyandthathehasnogroundsforreading

Heideggerasanticipatingcontemporaryanti-representationalisminthephilosophyof

mind.ThemisunderstandingderivesfromlackofsensitivitytoHeidegger’sown

intellectualcontext.TheotherwiselaudablestrategyofreadingHeideggerasa

philosopherofmindbecomesanexerciseinfindinganicheforHeideggerin

Dreyfus’sownunquestionedpresent.Heideggeristherebymappedontoan

intellectualcontextwhich,givenitsnaturalisticcommitments,isforeigntohim.The

paperconcludesbyindicatingthedirectioninwhichamorehistoricallysensitive,

andthusaccurate,interpretationofHeideggermustmove.

Inthelasttwentytotwenty-fiveyears,interestinthethoughtofMartin

Heideggerhasburgeoned.ThisisinlargepartduetoHubertL.Dreyfus’s

influentialinterpretation.Dreyfus’sgeneralinterpretativestrategyistoread

Heideggeras,firstandforemost,agenuinelytheoreticalphilosopherwith

importantthingstosayinoppositiontothedominantsubject/objectmodelof

cognitionandaction.Hedevelopsthisgeneralideaintoafairlydetailed

interpretationofHeideggerwhichsitswellwithcontemporarynaturalist

sensibilities,atleastifthesesensibilitiesaresufficientlylaid-backandnon-

reductivetoassuagefearsofcrudescientism.Inthisway,almostsingle-

handedly,hehassecuredforHeideggeracertainrespectabilityevenin

quartersbynatureandtraditionhostiletosuchostensiblyobscurantist,

`unscientific’philosophy.

AsDreyfusreadshim,Heidegger’scentralachievementliesinhisantici-

patingcontemporaryanti-representationalistcritiquesofrepresentational

theoriesofmind.Heidegger’sprimeinnovationandnoveltyistochallenge

thesubject/objectmodelofmindwhichhasdominatedphilosophyand

psychologyfromDescartesthroughHusserltothepresent.Thesubject/

objectmodelconstruestheknowingandacting`self’asa`subject’whichis

alwaysrelatedintentionallytotheworld via `representations’of`objects’.

Heidegger,accordingtoDreyfus,rejectsthis:`Heideggeracceptsintentional

directednessasessentialtohumanactivity,buthedeniesthat[all]

intentionalityismental,thatitis,asHusserl(followingBrentano)claimed,

thedistinguishingcharacteristicof mentalstates ’(pp.50Ð51;original

66 CarletonB.Christensen

emphasis).Inotherwords,whileHeideggerconcedesthatintentionalityis

essentialtobeinga`subject’or`self’,herejectsthetraditionalideathatitis

alwaysandonlyafeatureofthestandardfolk-psychologicalstatesand

experiences.IntentionalityisnotalwaysandonlywhatDreyfuscalls

representational intentionality,i.e.thebeingin,orhavingof,thestandard

folk-psychologicalintentionalstatesandexperiences(pp.72Ð74).While`we

sometimesexperienceourselvesasconscioussubjectsrelatingtoobjectsby

wayofintentionalstatessuchasdesires,beliefs,perceptions,intentions,etc.’

(p.5),Dreyfus’sHeideggeralsoinsiststhatouractuallyrelatingtoobjects

bywayofsuchstandardfolk-psychologicalstatesandexperiencesis`a

derivativeandintermittentcondition’(p.5).Onlywhenournormal,

everydaydealingswithfamiliarthingsbecomeproblematic,orbreakdown

completelydopsychologicalstatesandexperienceswithanykindofmental

orrepresentationalcontentarise(p.76).Speakingbothforhimselfandfor

Heidegger,Dreyfusinsiststhatwhenbreakdownoccursand`Istartto

deliberate,Idonotjustnoticementalstatesthatwerealreadythere;Istartto

have[suchmentalstatesas]beliefsanddesires’(p.78).Representational

intentionalityitself,whethercognitiveorvolitive,theoreticalorpractical,is

thusindeedanintermittentconditionfoundedin`amorefundamentalsortof

intentionality’(p.49)whichHeideggercalls`being-in’or`being-amidst’

(pp.44Ð46).Ingeneral,Heideggermaintainsthat`allrelationsofmental

statestotheirobjectspresupposeamorebasicformofbeing-with-things

whichdoesnotinvolvementalactivity’(p.52).Thismorebasicformof

being-with-thingsisanintentional,butquitenon-representationalskilful

engagementwitheverydaythingsÐwhatDreyfuscalls`absorbedcoping’.

Suchskilfulcopingwitheverydaythingsonlytakesplaceagainsta

backgroundfamiliaritywithorganizedwholesofsuchthings,e.g.rooms,

offices,andpublicplacesfurnishedintheirtypicalways.Dreyfusclaimsat

leastatoneplacethatsuchbackgroundfamiliarityiswhatHeideggermeans

`being-in-the-world’(pp.102Ð4).

Nowthethesisthatineverydayskilfulengagementwithfamiliarthingsno

`representations’,i.e.nostandardfolk-psychologicalstatesorexperiences,

arenecessarilyinvolvedisrathercounterintuitive,atleastwhentaken

literally.Surely,whenIamroutinelyhammeringaway,Idoseethatorhow

thenailisgoingasitshould,namely,straight,asIintend.Surely,Iquite

literallyperceive,cometheappropriatemoment,thatthenailhasbeen

hammeredinasrequired,sothatitistimetostophammering.SoisDreyfus

rightinattributingtheabove-mentionedthesistoHeidegger?Does

Heideggereversaythatinso-called`absorbedcoping’witheverydaythings

thereisnorepresentationalintentionality,inthequiteradicalsensethatall,

orindeedevenmost,oftheaboveeverydaydescriptionsarefalse?Thereare

twowaystoapproachthisquestion.Onecanlooktothesourcesandaskif

thepassagesDreyfusadducesasevidenceforhisinterpretationreallysay

GettingHeideggerOfftheWestCoast 67

whatheclaimstheysay.Oronecanattempttodrawanalternativeoverall

pictureofHeideggerfromwhichitfollowsthatHeideggerdoesnotsay,

perhapsevencontradicts,whatDreyfusputsintohismouth.(Ihaveoutlined

suchanalternativepictureinChristensen[1997].)Althoughbothapproaches

areessentialforanytrulycomprehensivecritiqueofDreyfus’sinterpretation,

itisclearthattheycannotbothbeundertakeninonepaper.HereIconcen-

trateexclusivelyonthefirst.Specifically,Iexaminethemostimportant

passagestowhichDreyfusappealstoseewhethertheyreallysaywhat

Dreyfusclaimstheydo.Havingshownthatthisisnotso,Igivesomefurther

reasonsforrejectinganysuggestionthatHeideggerissayingthekindsof

thingDreyfusattributestohim.Finally,Isuggestthedirectiontobetakenby

anyattempttodevelopamoreaccuratereadingofHeideggerasatheoretical

philosopherwithimportantthingstosayon`mind’,`intentionality’,andthe

like.

I.DreyfusandHeidegger’sCritiqueoftheTraditionalDoctrineof

Intentionality

DoesHeideggereversaythatinso-called`absorbedcoping’thereisno

representationalintentionality,eveninaminimal,folk-psychologicalsense?

Therearethreecentralpassages,allfrom GP ,which,atleastwhentakenout

ofcontext,appearmorethananyotherstogiveDreyfustheevidencehe

needs.IlookatthemintheorderinwhichDreyfusappealstothem.

AlthoughIshallbeconcentratingprimarilyonthesethreepassages,Iwill

alsooccasionallyconsiderpassagesfromotherHeideggertextstowhich

Dreyfusappeals.

(i)Thefirstpassageisfrom9(b),S.89(Hofstadter,pp.63Ð64).Ascited

byDreyfus(p.51),itreadsasfollows:

Theusualconceptionofintentionality...misconstruesthestructureoftheself-

directedness-toward,theintention.Thismisinterpretationliesin anerroneous

subjectivizing ofintentionality.Anegoorsubjectissupposed,towhoseso-called

sphereintentionalexperiencesarethensupposedtobelong...Theideaofasubject

whichhasintentionalexperiencesmerelyinsideitsownsphereandis...

encapsulatedwithinitselfisanabsurditywhichmisconstruesthebasicontological

structureofthebeingthatweourselvesare.(BP,63Ð64,originalemphasis).

Dreyfusclearlyregardsthispassageasamongsthisbestevidenceforthe

centralclaimthatHeideggerisdrawingattentionto`anewkindofinten-

tionality(absorbedcoping)whichisnotthatofamindwithcontentdirected

towardobjects’(p.69).Forthispassageisadducedpreciselyinsupportof

theclaimthatHeideggerisdenyingthat,inallcases,intentionality`is...

thedistinguishingcharacteristicof mentalstates ’(p.51;originalemphasis).

68 CarletonB.Christensen

Evenacursoryexaminationofthisquotationwithinitslargercontext

showsthatHeideggerisnotclaiminganythinglikethis.Forifthispassage

reallyweredenyingthatallintentionalityisrepresentational,thenitwould

surelyhavetooccurwithinalargerdiscussioninwhichHeideggertalks

preciselyof`absorbedcoping’.Afterall,`absorbedcoping’isDreyfus’sonly

exampleofnon-representationalintentionalityanditishardtoseewhatelse

couldqualifyassuch.Yetthroughouthisentirediscussionin9(b)

Heideggerdoesnottalk,evenonce,ofour`unthinking’(p.94)skilful

engagementwithfamiliarthings,butexclusivelyofperception!Indeed,

HeideggerreferspreciselytoperceptioninwhatDreyfushasomittedfrom

thefirsttwosentencesofhisquotation.Quotedfully,thesesentencesread:

TheusualconceptionofintentionalitymisunderstandsthattowardwhichÐinthe

caseofperceptionÐtheperceivingdirectsitself.Accordingly,italsomisconstrues

thestructureoftheself-directedness-toward,theintentio.Thismisinterpretationlies

inan erroneoussubjectivizing ofintentionality. 1

SowhateverHeideggerissayinghere,whatevertheerroneoussubjectivizing

isofwhichhespeaks,itisanerroneoussubjectivizingofperception.It

would,however,beabsurdtosaythat, pace thetradition,perceptionisnon-

representationalÐunless,ofcourse,oneunderstandsby`representation’

somethingquite non -minimal, non -folk-psychological, non -Searleanand

non -Husserlian,namely,anentityquiteliterallyinthemindwhichthemind

insomewaymanipulates,therebyachievingwhatisfolk-psychologically

calledperceivinganobject.Soalreadythereissubstantialevidenceagainst

anyclaimthatthispassageunderwritesthecentralcontentionofDreyfus’s

interpretation.

ThisbecomesalltheclearerwhenoneinvestigateswhatHeidegger

actuallymeansbytheerroneoussubjectivizingofperception.Heidegger

discussesthisin9(b)of GP ,S.86Ð91.Thereitisintroducedasthesecond

oftwowaysinwhichthenotionofintentionalityhastraditionallybeen

misinterpreted,thefirstbeingsotospeakitscomplement,namely,erroneous

objectivizing,whichapparentlyconsistsintreatingintentionalityasa

relationinaquitestandardsensebetweenasubjectandanexternalobject. 2 It

isimportanttonotehowHeideggeropenshisdiscussionofthissecondkind

ofmisinterpretation:hedescribesitas`anewkindofmisinterpretationto

whichnon-phenomenologicalphilosophyalmostuniversallyfallsvictim’. 3

Heideggerthusclearlyassociatesthetendencytosubjectivizeintentionality

primarilywith non -phenomenologicalphilosophy.Sohisveryopening

wordsindicatethathedoesnotwishtoaccuseHusserl,orforthatmatter

Scheler,oferroneoussubjectivizing.YetitisessentialtoDreyfus’s

interpretationthatHeideggershouldregardHusserljustasguiltyof

erroneoussubjectivizingaseitherDescartesor,say,Brentano.

GettingHeideggerOfftheWestCoast 69

ThatHeideggeristhinkingofneitherHusserlnorSchelerbecomeseven

clearerinthecourseofhisdiscussion.AccordingtoHeidegger,thetendency

tosubjectivizeintentionalityariseswhen,asinerroneousobjectivizing,one

persistsinthenaõ Èveassumptionthatintentionalityissomekindofrelationin

thestandardsense,yetunliketheerroneousobjectivizer,issophisticated

enoughtoappreciatethatintentionalphenomenasuchasperceivingscanbe

inerror.Appreciationofthispossibilitycombineswiththenaõ ÈveteÂcommon

tobotherroneousobjectivizinganderroneoussubjectivizingtoencourage

thethoughtthatthebearerofintentionalityisrelatedtosomethingpurely

subjective,somethingwhichdoesnotexistindependently,butratherbelongs

inasubjective,immanentsphere.

Intentionalexperiences( Erlebnisse ),itissaid,are qua itemswhichbelongtothe

subjectivesphere,inthemselvesrelatedonlytowhatisitselfimmanenttothis

sphere.Perceptionsassomethingpsychicaldirectthemselvestowardssensations,

mentalimages,memorytracesanddeterminationswhichareaddedbyasimilarly

immanentthinkingtowhatisinthe®rstinstancesubjectivelygiven. 4

Giventhischaracterizationoferroneoussubjectivizing,Heideggerwould

perhapsregardDescartes,Locke,andHumeasatleastoccasionallyguiltyof

it.Mostlikely,hehasBrentanoinmindsinceitisacommon,ifarguably,

mistaken,interpretation 5 oftheearlyBrentanothathewasledbythe

possibilityoferrortoregardtheintentionalobjectasinsomewayimmanent

tothemind. 6 Itisclear,however,thatHeideggercouldnotpossiblyhave

Husserlinhissights.ForHusserlexplicitlyattacksandridiculestheview

thatintentionalstatesandexperiencesaredirectedatanything`inthemind’.

WheninthisverysubsectionHeideggerinsiststhat`[t]hattowardswhich

perception...isdirectedistheperceiveditself’, 7 heisusing,andknows

himselftobeusing,aformofwordsderivedfromHusserl. With Husserl,and

bynomeans against him,Heideggersays:

Ineverydaybehavior,say,inmovingaroundthisroom,takingalookaroundmy

environment,Iperceivethewallandthewindow.TowhatamIdirectedinthis

perception?Tosensations?Or,whenIavoidwhatisperceived,amIturningaside

fromrepresentationalimagesandtakingcarenottofalloutoftheserepresentational

imagesandsensationsintothecourtyardoftheuniversitybuilding? 8

Innoway,then,doesHeideggercountHusserlamongsttheerroneous

subjectivizers.Sowhateverthecritiqueoftraditionalconceptionsof

intentionalityHeideggerisgivinghere,itdoesnottouchHusserl.Itis

thereforemistakentosubsumeHeidegger’scritiqueofHusserlunderthis

critiqueofthetradition.YetthisispreciselywhatDreyfusdoes,indeedmust

do.Iftheerroneoussubjectivizingmentionedinthepassagehequotesin

supportofhisinterpretationreallydidconsistinfailuretoappreciatethatnot

Plik z chomika:

Inne pliki z tego folderu:

Inne foldery tego chomika: