Marx's Nature.pdf

ORGANIZATION & ENVIRONMENT / December 2001

Clark / MARX’S NATURES

Dialogues and Debates

MARX’S NATURES

A Response to Foster and Burkett

JOHN CLARK

Loyola University New Orleans

I welcome the opportunity to reconsider the analysis of Marx and ecology

in my essay “Marx’s Inorganic Body” (Clark, 1989) and to discuss John

Bellamy Foster and Paul Burkett’s (2000) recent article in which they commented

on that analysis. In general, I find that my interpretation of Marx in that essay was

based on a careful and I think quite plausible reading; however, I now find it to be

rather limited and one-sided. I am happy to be able to comment on how I would now

broaden and revise that interpretation.

I would also like to comment on Foster and Burkett’s (2000) criticisms of my

position in the article. 1 Although I have many differences with Foster and Burkett

on central issues in philosophy and social theory, many of the views that they attrib-

ute to me are not the ones that I actually hold. One of my strongest interests is the

development of a critical and radically dialectical political ecology. It has never

occurred to me that this goal could be furthered by rejecting “political action and

education” for the sake of “personal redemption, ritualistic behavior, the denigra-

tion of human will, and the virtues of human irrationality” or by adopting “self-

effacement, passivity, and obedience to the ‘laws of nature’ that are held to be

supreme over the claims of human activity and praxis” (p. 421). Yet, Foster and

Burkett used precisely these terms (quoted from Murray Bookchin) to typify the

kind of “mystical ecology” that they attributed to me. Also, contrary to Foster and

Burkett’s contention, I do not support “the view that one can only be dialectical by

being nonscientific” (p. 422).

To clarify my view of Marx and ecology, I would like first of all to point out what

I see as certain divergent tendencies in Marx’s thought; second, to analyze the

meaning of teleology in philosophical discourse; third, to discuss the issue of

essentialism; and finally, to comment briefly on the significance of the term inor-

ganic body .

RECONSIDERING MARX’S ECOLOGIES

In the essay in question (Clark, 1989), I depicted two Marxes: a “Promethean”

one who is dominant in Marx’s thought and a more dialectical and ecological one

who remains primarily implicit. Today, I would stress the mutual coexistence and

interaction within the Marxian corpus of (at least) three Marxes who are relevant to

ecological concerns. First, there is the Promethean Marx, who was strongly empha-

sized in “Marx’s Inorganic Body.” Second, there is a managerial environmentalist,

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Clark / MARX’S NATURES

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systems-theoretical Marx. This Marx was mentioned in “Marx’s Inorganic Body”

but was merged with the former one, thus minimizing his contributions to the envi-

ronmental management, ecological stewardship tradition. This is the Marx dis-

cussed almost exclusively by Foster (2000) and Burkett (1999). Third, there is the

implicitly ecological, radically dialectical Marx. This Marx was analyzed in

“Marx’s Inorganic Body” but underemphasized in part on ideological grounds that

I would now reject. 2 I still see this third dimension as primarily latent and implicit in

Marx’s thought but as being of growing practical historical importance. Foster and

Burkett (2000; see also Burkett, 1999; Foster, 2000) show little awareness of the

existence of this Marx and appear to think that the managerial environmentalist

Marx is the true and fully ecological one.

However, it seems to me that Foster and Burkett (2000; see also Burkett, 1999;

Foster, 2000) do little if anything to exorcize the Promethean Marx. The fact is that

there are real tensions and contradictions in Marx’s thought. In particular, there is a

conflict between his critical and dialectical methodology and his liberatory project

on one hand, and his commitment on the other hand, to varying degrees at various

times, to centralist and statist politics, to technological utopianism, to patriarchal

values, to the mystique of industrialism, and to Eurocentric ideology.

Neither Foster nor Burkett (Foster & Burkett, 2000; see also Burkett, 1999; Fos-

ter, 2000) directs his attention to such enormous philosophical issues as the ques-

tion of technological domination and the possible contradiction between praxis and

self-determination on one hand, and the growing ascendancy of technique on the

other. They do not seem to recognize in any way the problematic character of

Marx’s (1857/1973) view (discussed in “Marx’s Inorganic Body” [Clark, 1989]) of

the progressive nature of industrial development in which the technological system

becomes a vast automated machine, and

the human being comes to relate more as watchman and regulator of the produc-

tion process itself. ...Nolonger does the worker insert a modified natural thing

[ Naturgegenstand ] as middle link between the object [ Objekt ] and himself; rather,

he asserts the process of nature, transformed into an industrial process, as a means

between himself and inorganic nature, mastering it. He steps to the side of the pro-

duction process instead of being its chief actor. (p. 705)

Yet, such productionist tendencies are an enduring current in Marx’s thought and,

combined with the statist and centralist policies that he advocated for the transition,

pose problems for his vision of a realm of freedom and self-determination.

Despite their charges of “idealism” against those who find evidence of a Prome-

thean Marx, Foster and Burkett’s (2000; see also Burkett, 1999; Foster, 2000) own

method of interpretation seems to lapse into idealism in neglecting the ways in

which the real conditions of his society, the political movements in which he partic-

ipated, and his own life shaped Marx’s ideas. For example, Marx was not immune to

the influences of a patriarchal society in constant rebellion against the feminine, he

personally had intense feelings of being dominated by his own mother, and he iden-

tified strongly with his father (Seigel, 1978, pp. 47-59). Foster and Burkett (2000;

see also Burkett, 1999; Foster, 2000) do not confront the evidence of patriarchal

ideology in Marx’s thought, including the ways in which his image of humanity’s

relationship to nature is influenced by this ideology.

I think that Foster and Burkett (2000) dismiss too lightly my suggestion that

Marx’s view of nature exhibits a certain antagonism toward nature and the “natural”

(i.e., precivilized) community as limiting maternal powers, that there is an Oedipal

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ORGANIZATION & ENVIRONMENT / December 2001

current in his thought, and that this current is manifested in Marx’s (1867/1967)

statements that “Where Nature is too lavish, she ‘keeps him in hand, like a child in

leading-strings.’ She does not impose upon him any necessity to develop himself”

(p. 513) and his view that “primitive man” suffers from a “narrowness” in social

relationships, because he “has not yet severed the umbilical cord” that ties him to

the “primitive tribal community.” (p. 79)

For Foster and Burkett (2000; see also Burkett, 1999; Foster, 2000), the possibil-

ity that Marxism could function as productionist, technobureaucratic ideology

(tinged with patriarchal and Eurocentric influences) cannot have a significant basis

in Marx’s own thought. To refute this possibility, they generally fall back on the fal-

lacious line of argument that because (a) Marx held a metaphysical theory (histori-

cal materialism) that recognized humanity as an integral part of nature; (b) he criti-

cized capitalism harshly for abusing the land, upsetting natural cycles, and so forth;

and (c) he believed that such abuses should not take place and indeed advocated an

ideal society in which they would not take place; consequently, (d) Marx could not

himself have held basic theoretical positions that are antiecological and (e) he could

not have himself consistently advocated political, economic, and technological

policies that are ecologically unsound.

Burkett (1999) at least recognizes that “certain passages in Marx and Engels’

writings seem to espouse an industrialist vision of revolution with questionable

ecological connotations” (p. 14). He does not, however, inquire whether there is any

systematic nature to these passages, and tellingly, he spends very little of his

300 pages of analysis on Marx’s theories of revolution and social transformation

and on the crucial problem of the transition, concentrating instead overwhelmingly

on Marx’s critique of capitalism and on his vision of a future communist society.

Foster (2000) and Burkett (1999) do, however, make a real contribution to the

study of Marx and ecology. They show that Marx went much further in presenting

an environmental stewardship or management view than I and a great many other

commentators have recognized. This is demonstrated very well in Burkett’s (1999)

exhaustive documentation of passages in which Marx discusses topics such as soil

conservation and pollution. I am grateful to him for his careful scholarship and for

correcting a shortcoming in my analysis and in that of many others.

What I do not find in either Foster’s (2000) or Burkett’s (1999) discussion is any

application to ecological questions of the kind of radically dialectical analysis that

Marx applies to the capitalist system and to human nature under that system. In fact,

many of Foster and Burkett’s (2000) own citations of Marx demonstrate the ecolog-

ically problematic nature of his outlook. For example, in defense of Marx’s ecologi-

cal qualities, Foster and Burkett (2000, p. 416) cite his statement that

from the standpoint of a higher economic form of society, private ownership of the

globe by single individuals will appear quite as absurd as the private ownership of

one man by another. Even a whole society, a nation, or even all simultaneously

existing societies taken together, are not the owners of the globe. They are only its

possessors, its usufructuaries, and like boni patres familias [good heads of the

household], they must hand it down to succeeding generations in an improved con-

dition. (Marx, 1894/1959, p. 776)

It is true that this passage exhibits a stewardship outlook that conflicts with ideas of

untrammeled, irresponsible human domination of nature. But, it certainly does not

exhibit an ecological conception of the place of humanity within nature. Indeed, it

expresses the idea that human beings can “possess” the earth, a concept that is both

Clark / MARX’S NATURES

435

arrogant and absurd from an ecological point of view. Moreover, it depicts humans

as the heads of the planetary household (the oikos ), and patriarchs at that.

Despite what I now see as the one-sidedness of “Marx’s Inorganic Body” (Clark,

1989), that article had the merit of proposing the possibility of a strongly dialecti-

cal, ecological Marx as the alternative in Marxist theory to the Promethean and

managerial stewardship views. My view was (and remains) that the ecological dia-

lectic remained primarily implicit in Marx’s thought and that “to develop the sub-

merged ecological dimension of Marx would mean the negation of key aspects of

his philosophy of history, his theory of human nature, and his view of social trans-

formation” (p. 250), including the elements of “productivism and instrumentalism”

still espoused by some in Marx’s name.

Although Marx did not develop the ecological dialectic, more than any other

modern philosopher, he offered suggestions concerning the ways in which a

nonidealist, historically grounded dialectic might be applied to the relationship

between humanity and nature. Fortunately, many theorists have taken up the chal-

lenge over the past decade or more and have developed a sophisticated ecological

Marxism that overcomes the limitations of orthodox Marxism and goes far beyond

the environmental management view that Foster and Burkett (2000; see also

Burkett, 1999; Foster, 2000) defend. 3

“THE HISTORICAL STRUGGLE BETWEEN

MATERIALISM AND TELEOLOGY”

In their discussion of my views and those of others concerning the subject of

teleology, Foster and Burkett (2000) assume that any teleological conception must

be crude, irrational, and antiscientific. Their view of teleology is epitomized in the

dictum that they quote from Aristotle: “Man alone of all the animals is erect,

because his nature and his substance are divine.” However, there is, in addition to

this regressive outlook, another more naturalistic side to Aristotle’s teleology,

inspired by his empirical observations as a biological scientist. And, although Vol-

taire ridiculed teleological thinkers for marveling at such facts as that the nose is so

perfectly designed to support spectacles, he also proclaimed Epicurus worthy of

mockery for failing to recognize the reasonable uses of teleological explanation.

In short, I think that Foster and Burkett (2000) have a rather oversimplified view

of the matter. I would therefore like to discuss briefly the ways in which their dis-

cussion of teleology tends to mislead the reader, insofar as it does not take into

account contemporary philosophical discussion of this concept, in addition to pre-

senting a one-sided depiction of its meaning throughout the history of philosophy

back to Aristotle.

Interestingly, Foster (2000) praises the eminent evolutionary biologist and phi-

losopher of science Ernst Mayr as “one of the foremost contributors to the neo-

Darwinian synthesis” (p. 186) and invokes Mayr in criticizing essentialism. Yet,

Foster and Burkett (2000) ignore Mayr’s (1988) careful analysis of the ways in

which teleological explanation is important to contemporary biology. Mayr noted

that teleological language “is frequently used in biology in order to make state-

ments about the functions of organs, about physiological processes, and about the

behavior and actions of species and individuals” and that “many biologists have

continued to insist that such teleological statements are objective and free of meta-

physical content” (p. 38). For Mayr, there are two kinds of “end-directed processes”

in nature: “teleomatic processes in inanimate nature,” which are “end-directed only

in a passive, automatic way, regulated by external forces or conditions” (p. 44), and

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ORGANIZATION & ENVIRONMENT / December 2001

more significantly, “teleonomic processes in living nature,” in which a process

“owes its goal-directedness to the operation of a program” (p. 45). Biological sys-

tems are of the latter kind (p. 53). Finally, Mayr argued that teleonomic explana-

tions are not only rationally admissible but also scientifically necessary in order to

make meaningful statements about certain biological processes (p. 55).

Furthermore, Foster and Burkett (2000) overlook discussions of teleology in

contemporary ecological philosophy. The greatest contribution in this area has

been made by Holmes Rolston (1988), one of the most widely recognized and influ-

ential contemporary ecological philosophers. According to Rolston,

something more than causes, if less than sentience, is operating in every organism.

There is information superintending the causes; without it the organism would col-

lapse into a sand heap. This information is a modern equivalent of what Aristotle

called formal and final causes; it gives the organism a telos , “end,” a kind of non-

felt purpose. Organisms have ends, although not always ends-in-view. All this

cargo is carried by the DNA, essentially a linguistic molecule. (p. 98)

An organism, Rolston says, has “a good-of-its-kind ; it defends its own kind as a

good kind ” (p. 101).

Whether the details of Rolston’s (1988) and Mayr’s (1988) reconceptualizations

of teleology are convincing or not can certainly be debated. Nevertheless, it is not

helpful to discuss contemporary concepts as if there has been no development of

thinking on this topic since scholastic versions of Aristotelianism or to contend that

those who utilize the concept are in some way antiscientific.

Finally, Foster and Burkett (2000) do not consider the meaning of the term tele-

ology in ethical theory, a meaning that is quite relevant to the analysis of Marx’s

thought in “Marx’s Inorganic Body” (Clark, 1989). There are two main branches of

ethical theory. The first, deontological ethics (from the Greek deont , “that which is

binding”) focuses on one’s duty to do what is right. Deontological theories stress

such concerns as justice and fairness, obedience to moral or natural law, respect for

persons, and faithfulness to agreements and contracts. The second, teleological eth-

ics (from the Greek telos , “end,” and teleios , “perfected”) focuses, on the other

hand, on some ultimate (or intrinsic) good that can be attained through one’s action.

One branch of teleological ethics is consequentialist or utilitarian theory, which

defines the good in terms of the maximization of pleasure, happiness, satisfaction,

interests, or choices. The other major branch defines it in terms of self-realization,

sometimes as the achievement of virtues or excellences, but more generally as the

actualization of the highest potentialities for oneself and for other persons (or

beings).

Recent forms of ecological teleological ethics focus on holistic or systemic pro-

cesses of self-realization, in which this realization applies not only to human

beings, or even to organisms, but also to larger natural and biological realities such

as ecosystems, species, and even the biosphere. To relate Marx to this tradition is in

no way to link him to the sort of teleological irrationalisms that Spinoza, Voltaire,

and many others in modern philosophy demolished long ago. It is rather to say that

the dialectical and holistic dimensions of Marx’s thought have an important rela-

tionship to the most promising tendencies in contemporary environmental ethics

and that they can make a highly significant contribution to the field if these dimen-

sions are fully developed.

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