Nietzsche And Morality.pdf

Nietzsche and Morality

Raymond Geuss

Although he occasionally referred to himself as an ‘immoralist’ (EH ‘ Warum ich

ein Schicksal bin ’), in one important sense Nietzsche was not one, if only because

he didn’t in fact think that there was a single, distinct phenomenon – ‘morality’ –

which it would make much sense to be universally in favour of or opposed to.

Nietzsche was a conscious anti-essentialist in that he didn’t think that terms like

‘morality’ always and everywhere referred to items that shared the same defin-

ing traits. Rather he had a view like that which Wittgenstein was to develop fifty

or sixty years later: There isn’t any ‘essence of morality’ (or ‘of religion’ or ‘of

truth’ or what-not), that is any set of important properties that all instances of

what can correctly be called ‘morality’ must exhibit. ‘Morality’ encompasses a

wide variety of different sorts of things that are at best connected to each other by

‘family resemblances’, and there are no antecendently specifiable limits to what

can count as sufficient ‘resemblance’ to make the term ‘morality’ correctly applic-

able.

Thus I take the point of the third essay in JGB, entitled ‘ Das religiöse Wesen ’ to

be precisely that there isn’t any such thing as ‘the essence’ of religion. There are

just different constellations of practices, beliefs, and institutions that have very

different origins, internal structures, motivational properties, and social func-

tions, each constellation having ‘sufficient’ similarity to some other constellations

to allow the same word (‘religion’) to be used of all of them, but what counts as

‘sufficient’ similarity is antecedently indeterminate, and no two religions will

necessarily be at all ‘similar’ in any given significant respect. Another way of

putting this is that for Nietzsche there is no absolutely clear and sharp distinction

between literal and metaphorical usage or between the proper and an extended

sense of a term (cf. ÜWL).

Anti-essentialism, properly understood, need not imply that one can say noth-

ing general and true about all the instances that happen to be taken to fall under

a certain term. That the members of a family resemble each other not by virtue of

all having the same essential feature (e.g. the same kind of nose or lip) but by

virtue of different similarities individuals have in different features, does not

mean that there is nothing true that can be said about all members of the family,

for instance that they all are human beings, or all have noses (of one sort or

another, if that is true of them). That, in turn, needn’t imply that we couldn’t call

a cat or horse an important member of the family, or for that matter that we

European Journal of Philosophy 5:1 ISSN 0966–8373 pp. 1–20 .

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1JF, UK, and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

Raymond Geuss

couldn’t in some contexts properly call an old violin, a portrait, or a glass a

member of the family.

There are, then, an indefinite number of different (possible and actual) kinds

of things that could be called ‘morality’ without impropriety (JGB §186). Some of

these different moralities exist at different times and places, but some may over-

lap. ‘Modern’ people (i.e. late 19th century middle-class Central Europeans) are

best understood not as bearers of a single unitary Sittlichkeit 1 but rather as stand-

ing under the influence of a variety of diverse forms of morality (JGB §215). In

fact, Nietzsche holds that it is a sign of an especially elevated spiritual life to expe-

rience in oneself the unresolved struggle of incompatible moral points of view

and forms of evaluation (GM I. 16). Just because there are so many different types

of morality, it makes sense, Nietzsche thinks, to begin the study of morality with

a natural history of the phenomenon, a ‘typology’ of the existing forms of moral-

ity, and an investigation of their origins, functions, relative strengths, and char-

acteristic weaknesses (JGB §186ff.)

Despite the wide variability of what could legitimately be called ‘morality’, in

19th century Europe ‘morality’ had come to be used most commonly to designate

one particular form of morality, important parts of which were ultimately

derived from Christianity. The claim that there was a dominant morality in 19th

century Europe which developed out of Christianity is not incompatible with the

claim made at JGB §215 and cited above that ‘modern’ people characteristically

live according to a variety of different moralities. First of all the specifically

Christian morality may have been predominant in the recent past (i.e. up to the

beginning of the 19th century) and may have just recently (as of the middle of the

19th century) begun to be displaced by other forms of morality, but this process

may be incomplete. Second, Christian morality may have been and to some extent

may still be ‘dominant’ in the sense that it governs wide areas of life (although

perhaps not all areas), has a kind of public and quasi-official standing and defines

the terms in which people think and speak about morality when they are think-

ing most reflectively or speaking in a public context. This might be true even

though in other areas of life people also use other standards of evaluation, have

other forms of sensibility, etc. which are incompatible with the Christian ones.

They may fail to be aware that their sensibility and their reactions are not fully

and exclusively Christian, they may assess actions by standards that diverge from

those of Christianity and have a slightly guilty conscience about this, they may

explicitly assess individual actions in concrete cases by non-Christian standards,

but remain under the influence of Christianity when it comes to giving general

theoretical form to their reflections on morality, etc.

Given Nietzsche’s location in history and his anti-essentialism, it is not odd for

him sometimes to follow widespread usage and use ‘morality’ to refer to the

specifically Christian (or immediately post-Christian) morality of the European

19th century. In reading Nietzsche it is thus very important to try to determine in

each particular case whether he is using ‘morality’ in the narrow sense to mean

(19th century Christian) morality or in a more general sense.

Nietzsche specifically states that the fact that there are many different

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Nietzsche and Morality

‘moralities’ should not be interpreted to mean that no form of morality is at all

binding (‘ verbindlich ’ FW §345). Given his general position, one would also

expect him to think that there are very different kinds of ‘bindingness’. The

Christian conscience and the Kantian specifically moral ‘ought’ are not univer-

sal phenomena, but the historical products of particular circumstances. They

don’t have the universal, unconditional validity claimed for them by Kantians

and Christians, but it doesn’t follow from that that they don’t have some other

kind of ‘ Verbindlichkeit ’ at least for some people in some circumstances.

Furthermore, Nietzsche repeatedly stresses that valuation, giving preference to

one thing over another, discrimination is a central part of the way we live as

human beings (GM II. 8); he sometimes even calls it a fundamental property of

‘life itself’ (JGB §9). 2

These preliminary remarks suggest that although Nietzsche is against the domi-

nant 19th century form of morality, he isn’t necessarily against morality tout court .

To place oneself beyond good and evil need not mean to place oneself beyond

good and bad or to become indifferent to discriminations between good and less

good (GM I. 17). If one thinks of a morality, for instance, just as a non-random

way of discriminating good from less good, it isn’t clear how it could make much

sense to be against that. If one takes the passage at FW §345 seriously, Nietzsche

seems to be claiming that there could be systematic forms of evaluation or

discrimination that did have a hold on us, one or another kind of ‘ Verbindlichkeit ’

for us (although not, of course, a ‘ Verbindlichkeit ’ of the kind claimed by tradi-

tional Christian morality). Such binding forms of valuation might be thought to

be potentially the kernel of the ‘higher form of morality’ which Nietzsche some-

times suggests is possible (JGB §202) and which, whatever other properties it

might have, would not be subject to the kinds of criticism Nietzsche levels against

Christian morality.

Whether or not the above is a plausible line of thought may become clearer if

one first examines the exact nature of Nietzsche’s objections to Christian morality

and its derivatives.

Nietzsche holds that the traditional European morality derived from

Christianity is structured by six characteristic theses:

(1) This morality claims of itself that it is ‘unconditional’ in the obliga-

tions it imposes. (JGB §199)

(2) It claims a kind of universality, i.e. to apply equally to all human

beings. (JGB §§198, 221)

(3) It claims that only free human actions have moral value. (JGB §32; GM

I. 13)

(4) It claims that the moral worth of a free action depends on the quality

of the human choice that leads the agent to perform it. (JGB §32)

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Raymond Geuss

(5) It claims that human beings and their actions are to be evaluated

(positively) as ‘good’ or (negatively) as ‘evil’ depending on the kind

of human choice involved. (JGB §260)

(6) It claims that we are responsible for our choices and should feel guilt

or remorse for evil choices, etc. (GM I. 13, III.15, 20) 3

Nietzsche wishes to claim (contra (1) above) that ‘the taste for the unconditional

is the worst of all tastes’ (JGB §31). Slaves are the kind of people who need and

keenly desire the unconditional or absolute because they really understand only

tyranny (JGB §46, cf. §§198, 199, 221). I take Nietzsche’s argument here to be

something like the following: The plausibility of (1) results from a kind of fasci-

nation with the idea of unconditional obligations, but the most plausible expla-

nation for this fascination is that it arises out of an extreme need for order and

predictability which is a frequently encountered trait of weak and helpless people

who face a potentially dangerous and unstable environment, and who are under-

standably ready to grasp at virtually any means to introduce regularity into their

world. An ‘unconditional obligation’ is one that could be counted on no matter

what and hence one that would introduce a high degree of predictability into at

least some portion of the world. People who are especially strong or competent

in a particular domain or respect, Nietzsche thinks, don’t need to fear the lack of

absolute, unconditional predictability in that domain – if they are truly strong

and competent, they will expect to be able to deal with whatever comes up, even

with the unpredictable and unexpected. If one adds to this account that slaves in

addition to being weak (as Nietzsche assumes) will also be likely to have as their

basic direct experience of the social order the absolute commands given to them

by their masters, it wouldn’t be surprising if slaves developed the ‘bad taste’ of a

fascination with unconditional obligation. So Nietzsche wishes to reverse what he

takes to have been the traditional prejudice: To keep looking for the absolute, the

unconditional, the ‘essential’ (which is just the set of properties a thing can

absolutely reliably be expected to have) is not a sign of special superiority or

profundity, but of a servile disposition too weak to tolerate disorder, complexity,

ambiguity, and the unpredictable (cf. JGB §59 and FW §5).

The above isn’t, of course, an argument against the existence of unconditional

obligations, but then Nietzsche thinks it is as much of an argument against them

as any argument that has been given for them. Given the kind of thesis this is,

psychological considerations about the type of person who is most likely to find

this approach to morality plausible are, Nietzsche believes, perfectly appropriate.

It is no argument against Nietzsche’s view here to claim that it is in some sense

necessary or highly desirable for us to introduce order and predictability into our

social world by assigning unconditional obligations to one another because other-

wise things would be too chaotic for human life to continue. Whether or not this

is true, it is not incompatible with the Nietzschean view I have just described. All

humans may just be so weak that we need this kind of order. In the first instance

Nietzsche merely wishes to claim a connection between the need for order (which

lies, he thinks, behind the ascription of absolute obligations) and the relative level

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Nietzsche and Morality 5

of strength and weakness of those who feel the need to ascribe such obligations.

It is a completely separate issue whether or not some person or people might be

so strong as to be able to dispense with the very idea of an unconditional obliga-

tion altogether.

Nietzsche goes so far in rejecting the universality of morality as to assert at one

point that it is ‘immoral’ ( ‘unmoralisch ’) to hold that the same moral code should

apply to all (JGB §221, cf. JGB 43, 46, 198, 199, 228, 284). To the extent to which he

gives reasons for this rejection which go beyond appeals to ‘taste’ (JGB §43) 4 these

reasons seem to depend on his doctrines of ‘rank-ordering’ and of the ‘pathos of

distance’. Nietzsche believes that in general 5 the creation of positive values, the

‘elevation of the human type’ (JGB §257), can result only from what he calls the

‘pathos of distance’ (JGB §257, GM I. 2). The ‘pathos of distance’ is the long-last-

ing feeling on the part of a ‘higher ruling order’ of its total superiority in relation

to a ‘lower’ order, and although this feeling may eventually take a more subli-

mated form, its origin will be in crude relations of physical domination of one

group over another, that is, in some form of slavery (GS). Only such a ‘distance’

between ‘rank-orders’ generates the requisite tension, as it were, to allow new

values to be created. So originally slavery is not just instrumentally necessary in

order to provide (for instance) leisure for members of the upper classes to

produce and appreciate various cultural artefacts, but rather slaves were a kind

of social-psychological necessity because only if the members of a group have

others to look down on and despise as wholly inferior will they be able to create

positive values. 6 Valuing, Nietzsche thinks, is an inherently discriminatory activ-

ity; it is a positing of one thing as better than something else, and if this discrim-

ination is to be active and positive it must arise out of the positive sense of self

that can exist only in a society of ‘rank-orders’, i.e. where this kind of distance

exists. 7

Nietzsche’s main objection to universal forms of morality is that they tend to

break down the rank-ordering in society. In a rank-ordered society there will be

different codes governing behaviour among members of the same rank and behav-

iour of the members of one rank to those of another (JGB §260). If the rank-order-

ing of a society is undermined, the pathos of distance will be in danger of

disappearing and the society will run the risk of losing the ability to produce new

positive values (JGB §202). A society unable to produce new positive values is

decadent, and Nietzsche seems to think such decadence is self-evidently the worst

thing that can happen to a society. This line of argument presupposes that one can

give a relatively clear sense to the distinction between active, positive valuation

and negative, reactive valuation, and that the ‘health’ which consists in the contin-

ued ability to produce new positive values is the most appropriate final frame-

work for discussing forms of morality. So theses (1) and (2) are to be rejected.

Notoriously Nietzsche denies that there is any such thing as ‘free will’ (JGB

§21; GD ‘ Die vier großen Irrtümer ’ §7). His denial that the will is free doesn’t imply

that he thinks the will is unfree, enslaved, or in bondage. Rather he holds that the

whole conceptual pair ‘free/unfree’ is a fiction having no real application to ‘the

will’. 8

‘Free will’ was an invention of weak people (slaves) who appropriated a

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