German Politics&Society 2006, vol 24, nr 1.pdf

Introduction

The Drama of 2005 and the Future of German Politics

Eric Langenbacher

Government, Georgetown University

I recall a conversation from a while back with a colleague. He was

disdainful of German politics, stating that they are ponderous, lack-

luster, even boring. He prefers to follow Italian politics because of

the intrigue, emotion, and, most of all, the drama. Although forced

to agree at the time that the contrast between the two countries

could not be greater, I was also immediately reminded of the old

(apocryphal) Chinese curse, "may you live in interesting times."

My, how times have changed. German political life has witnessed

some of the most dramatic events since at least the period of unifica-

tion over fifteen years ago, and perhaps since the inception of the

Federal Republic. It is this highly important and dramatic 2005 elec-

tion to which this special issue of German Politics and Society is dedi-

cated. The contributors analyze the results, but also locate current

developments in the history and traditions of the Federal Republic.

Just as important, they project trends and policies into the future.

What will Angela Merkel and her grand coalition achieve? What

will become of the German party system? What long-term structural

changes are affecting German politics and policy-making?

Drama on the Left

As with the interpretation of any drama, one must first begin with a

plot summary-an overview of the major, attention-grabbing devel-

opments. The narrative begins with a string of electoral defeats at

the regional level that culminated in the Social Democrats (SPD) los-

ing the state election in North Rhine Westphalia in late May 2005.

German Politia and Society, Issue 78 Vol. 24, No. J, Spring 2006

Eric Langenbacher

This in itself was remarkable, seeing that the old Ruhrgebiet was a

heartland of SPD support, ruled by the Social Democrats (at least as

senior coalition partners) for nearly forty consecutive years. One of

the reasons for this defeat was Chancellor Schroder's severe loss of

support within his own party. Almost always fractious and divided

between centrist moderates and trade union-oriented leftists, the

party could not maintain solidarity and support in the face of the

Red-Green government's reformist agenda and program (Agenda

2010, Hartz Reforms, etc.)-and one might add, in the face of the

daunting and structural economic and social problems that the coun-

try has faced for at least a decade. Radicals led inside and outside of

the government by Oscar Lafontaine and others were never enam-

ored of the telegenic, "American" centrism that Schroder repre-

sented, but at least he could win elections for the team. The regional

defeats in the Lander eroded even this tenuous reason for radical

support. Schroder understood acutely the magnitude of the party's

defeat in North Rhine Westphalia and elsewhere (and not just

because of the legislative gridlock that this created in the opposition-

controlled Bundesrat) and the dangers of the loss of internal support.

He soon launched unprecedented political and constitutional machi-

nations to salvage his power.

His first step was to bring down his own government by con-

sciously staging and then losing a vote of confidence on July 1.

Schroder engineered this as a last ditch attempt to maintain power,

by forcing his party to declare support for him and by catching the

opposition off-guard with the unexpected election that would have

to follow. Of course, his official justification was that he lacked a

mandate to govern and to implement his reforms and was calling the

election early to obtain one. He added that Germany could not

afford to lose another year or even two (until the next regularly

scheduled Bundestag election) because of weak governance and

gridlock. The constructive vote of non-confidence and other parlia-

mentary norms were not supposed to allow for such a Weimaresque

tactic. Yet, the Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) ruled

on August 25 that it was constitutional and that a new election,

already under way, was indeed necessary. Postwar Germany rarely

had witnessed such expert maneuvering, nor such an adept political

operative. Most surprising of all was that it almost worked, in light of

Introduction

the eventual result—with the SPD retaining 34.2 percent support—ver-

sus just 35.2 percent for the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSu).'

Despite this unexpectedly strong showing and some valiant attempts

to try to remain chancellor, Schroder was gone quickly from the polit-

ical stage (as were many other senior political figures). Finally, in the

worst "American" fashion he very soon took up a high-level position

on the board of a German-Russian pipeline consortium (Gazprom), a

decision that generated enormous criticism given that he advocated

this deal while in public office (and which was retrospective evidence

for his overly close relationship with Putin and Russia).

Drama on the Right

There was also more than enough drama on the other side. The rise

of Angela Merkel, the first female party leader and chancellor in Ger-

man history (as well as the first Easterner since unification), has been

long in coming. Her steadfast, largely private maneuvering began

already in earnest when she took over as General Secretary of the

CDU in 1998. As in an ancient Greek tragedy, these traits were on full

display when she denounced her original political sponsor Helmut

Kohl and Wolfgang Schauble in 1999 in the midst of the CDU party

financing scandal, becoming party leader in 2000. Having lost the

Right's chancellor candidate spot in 2002 to Bavaria's Edmund

Stoiber (in retrospect an adept move, given the likelihood that the

SPD-green government would be re-elected and given the impor-

tance of exhausting her internal opponents), she quietly assured her-

self of this position by 2005. Since her ascendance within the party

and now to the chancellorship, she has faced vociferous opposition

from traditional party bigwigs and especially from the entrenched

regional bosses like Stoiber, Roland Koch of Hessen and Christian

Wulf in Lower Saxony. Nevertheless, she has outmaneuvered them

all, gaining the highest office in the land-and these behind-the-scenes

pohtical skills, though often ignored, are some of her greatest assets.

Yet, it should not be forgotten that one big component of Merkel's

drama in 2005 was the unprecedented loss of voters' support by elec-

tion day. Polling only 35 percent of the vote (less than Stoiber in

2002 and the one of the worst results for the conservatives since

Eric Langenbacher

World War II), she blew a 20-point lead, according to public opinion

polls taken in the early summer. The reasons behind "her" loss of

support included: the exceptional political gifts of Schroder-both

personally as exemplified by his resounding "victory" in the televised

debate on September 4 and in terms of the slick, even populist cam-

paign that his SPD ran; tepid support from her party, especially the

regional bosses; her own lackluster campaigning style; some missteps

on the campaign trail (especially some controversial remarks about

the desirability of a flat tax from her shadow finance minister, Paul

Kirchhoff); a hurried campaign platform; and, last but not least, the

extremely challenging economic and social issues that the country

currently faces, where solutions are in short supply and support for

radical reforms amongst the electorate is even lower. The eventual

poor CDU result and the most fragmented Bundestag ever-with five

parties achieving significant representation and the two people's par-

ties receiving less than 70 percent of the vote between them—made

traditional coalition options untenable. Despite weeks of dramatic

speculation over unusual coalition combinations, the widely dispar-

aged grand coalition emerged as the only viable option.

Minidramas

There were other dramatic sub-plots affecting the smaller parties

that provided even more excitement. The free market and generally

libertarian Free Democrats (FDP) scored their best result since the

unity election of 1990 and seem to have returned to their levels of

support in the 1970s and 1980s. Almost all of this support came from

Western Germany (unhke the election of 1990) and the party did not

even make nominal efforts to reach out to the East. Nevertheless,

this strong result shows that support for the kinds of neoliberal

reforms that many think Germany needs is not unsubstantial, at least

amongst Westerners. The Greens also did relatively well, having

avoided a significant loss of support despite sharing governing

responsibility for seven years and despite the persistent internal dis-

sension between "realos" and "fundis." It is rather interesting that

the SPD tore itself apart over the course of Schroder's chancellorship

but the ever-feisty Greens (how many times did former Foreign

Introduction

Minister Joschka Fischer have eggs or paint thrown at him during

party congresses?) did not.

More important was the formation and then strong result of a

new party, formed by the former East German communist Party of

Democratic Socialism (PDS) and dissident left-wing factions of the

SPD. Led by the charismatic Gregor Gysi and Oscar Lafontaine (long

the bane of the Schroder-Miintefering SPD), the new Left Party

gained 8.7 percent of the vote nationwide, but over 25 percent

(more than the CDu) in the East. Most importantly, this new party

has been able to move beyond the old PDS' ghettoization in the East,

making major in-roads in the West-in fact, gaining 4.9 percent of the

vote there (although see Jeffrey Kopstein and Daniel Ziblatt's article

in this issue for a different interpretation). The consequences of this

new party and its occupation of the left side of the ideological spec-

trum are open and potentially massive. On the one hand, this might

signify the resurgence of a radical and ideological left wing in Ger-

man politics, un-checked by the moderating tendencies of the domi-

nant pragmatic faction of the SPD. Splintering on this side of the

spectrum may make the Left incapable of governing as a bloc for

quite some time. On the other hand, radicals may leave the SPD to

the pragmatists, making it easier for the rump party to govern and

run postmodern election campaigns around valence issues, compe-

tence and leadership. Of course, there is often the need in any

democracy for a protest movement and, one could say this is better

coming from the Left (especially in Germany with its ever present

past) than the Right.

On the other side of the spectrum, early in the year there was

widespread fear that radical rightists would do much better than in

the past and actually surmount the 5 percent electoral threshold to

gain representation in the Bundestag. Many observers feared the

worst because persistent economic problems, especially in the East,

have created a significEint support base for these parties, manifested

in recent state electoral successes-most notably the National Democ-

ratic Party (NPD) receiving 9 percent in the Saxon Landtag election

of 2004. There were also unprecedented efforts to achieve unity

amongst extreme Right parties. But, once again, divisiveness, lack of

professionalism, poor leadership, the existence of another protest

party-the Left Party had engaged in anti-foreigner, anti-immigrant

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